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Vimeiro, Espinosa de los Montaños, Tudela, La Coruña    November 1808 — January 1809.  A series of defeats provoked Napoleon to lead 200,000 men into the Peninsula. The British attacked near Burgos but were soon forced into a long retreat punctuated by the battles of Sahagún, Benavente and Cacabelos, ending in an evacuation from Coruña in January, 1809. Moore was mortally wounded while directing the defence of the town in the Battle of Coruña. After only two months in Spain, Napoleon handed command over to Marshal Soult and returned to France, to prepare for renewed hostilities against Austria..  Espinosa de los Monteros  A Spanish army under General Joaquin Blake advanced, hoping to cut the French lines of communication back to Bayonne, but instead was defeated by a French army under Marshal Lefebvre at Zornoza on 31 October, and retreated back to Bilbao. Blake then turned at bay to rescue one of his divisions trapped in the mountains (5 November), before resuming his retreat.  By 10 November three French Corps were threatening Blake’s retreat. In direct pursuit through the mountains came Marshal Victor’s I Corps. Lefebvre’s V Corps was on a flank march toward Reinosa, well to the southwest of the Blake. Marshal Soult’s II Corps routed a Spanish army at Gamonal and captured Burgos.  After a skirmish at Valmaceda on 8 November, Blake reached Espinosa de los Monteros with 22,000 men. Blake was informed that he was in danger of being cut off. He took advantage of a ridge line at Espinosa to make a stand north of the Trueba River. On his right he placed his rearguard of 5,000 experienced soldiers under San Román, on a hill close to the river. In the center the ridgeline descended into gap held by the Vanguard Brigade and the 3rd Division. On the left, the Asturian division held Las Peñucas ridge. Two Divisions and a brigade were in reserve.  Victor had around 21,000 infantry in three divisions. They would have to attack from the Campo de Pedralva, a small plain to the. The battle began early in the afternoon of 10 November when General Villatte’s division arrived well ahead of the rest of the French army. Instead of waiting for Victor, he launched an attack against the Spanish right, masking that attack with six battalions to guard against a counterattack.  After two hours, the Spanish position was holding well. At around 3 PM Victor arrived along with his remaining two divisions. These fresh troops attacked the same part of the Spanish right with nine battalions while leaving the rest of the Spanish line untouched. This allowed Blake to move his 2nd and 3rd Divisions to the right to support San Román. Once again the French attack was repulsed.  Although the battle continued the next day, most of the casualties were suffered on the first day. Both sides lost about 1,000 men killed and wounded.   Battle of Tudela  On 21 November Castaños was between Logroño and Tudela. The French III Corps had crossed the Ebro at Logroño, heading east towards Calahorra, while Marshal Ney’s column had reached the upper Douro valley and was headed in the direction of Tudela. This left Castaños’s army in serious danger of being trapped between two French corps.  Castaños escaped by pulling back to Tudela. There he decided to defend a ten mile long front, stretching west from Tudela on the banks of the Ebro, along the line of a small river to Cascante and then to Tarazona, at the foot of the Sierra de Moncayo. Castaños was well aware that he did not have enough men to defend this line, and so he called for help from General O’Neille’s two divisions at Caparrosa on the east bank of the Ebro. O’Neille was under the command of Palafox, and refused to move without permission from his commander. This was not given until noon on 22 November. O’Neille reached the east bank of the Ebro opposite Tudela late on the same day, but then decided to postpone his crossing until the 23rd.  At nightfall on 22 November Castaños’s army was very badly stretched. Close to 45,000 Spanish troops were in the vicinity of Tudela, very few of them in the front line. Castaños placed two divisions of his own army at Cascante and Tarazona. His third division was on the east bank of the Ebro, as were the two divisions from the Army of Aragón (O’Neille and Saint March). During the battle of 23 November most of the fighting would involve these last three divisions, a force of around 23,000 infantry. Castaños also had a large number of horsemen – 3,600 in total – but failed to employ them, and would be caught completely by surprise.  On the morning of 23 November Lannes split his corps into two columns. The smaller column, containing Lagrange’s infantry division and two cavalry brigades, was sent towards Cascante, while the larger column, containing Moncey’s III Corps, was sent along the Ebro towards Tudela. Lagrange would not be involved in the fighting at Tudela. Marshal Lannes force was just under 34,000 strong, including the four infantry divisions and three cavalry regiments of Moncey’s Corps as well as Lagrange’s infantry division and Colbert’s cavalry from Ney’s corps. On the night before the battle Lannes’s force had camped at Alfaro, ten miles up the Ebro from Tudela.  While the French were advancing, Castaños was attempting to get O’Neille’s three divisions across the Ebro. General Roca was across first, and had just reached his place at the right of the Spanish line when the French made their first attack. Saint March’s division was second to cross, and was also able to take its allotted place in the line before the French attacked, but O’Neille’s division had to fight off a force of French skirmishers who had reached the top of the Cabezo Malla ridge ahead of them.  This first French attack was carried out by Lannes’s vanguard. As he arrived in front of Tudela, the Marshal had realised that the Spanish were not yet in place, and had decided to risk launching an improvised attack with his leading brigades. This attack was repulsed, but it did reveal just how weak the Spanish position was. Even after the three divisions at Tudela were in place, there was still a three mile gap to La Peña’s force at Cascante.  The result of the battle would be decided by the behaviour of La Peña and Grimarest. By noon both men had received orders to move – La Peña to close the gap with the troops at Tudela, and Grimarest to Cascante. Neither man responded. La Peña moved two brigades slightly to the east, but made no other move, allowing his division to be pinned in place by two French cavalry brigades. At noon Castaños himself attempted to reach La Peña to order him to move in person, but his movement was detected by some French cavalrymen, and he only escaped after a long chase.  Marshal Lannes’s second attack was carried out in much greater strength. On the French left Morlot’s division attacked Roca’s division on the heights above Tudela. To the right Mathieu’s division made a frontal assault on O’Neille, while attempting to outflank him. Both attacks succeeded. Roca’s division broke when French troops began to reach the top of the ridge, while O’Neille’s was pushed off the ridge and outflanked. Finally the French cavalry under Lefebvre-Desnouettes charged at the gap between Roca and Saint March, and the entire Spanish right collapsed.  Meanwhile on the left La Peña and Grimarest had finally united at Cascante, giving them a total of around 18,000 infantry and 3,000 foot. They were opposed by Legrange’s division, 6,000 strong, and a small number of dragoons. After watching the defeat of the rest of the Spanish army, they withdrew under cover of darkness. The Spanish left suffered only 200 killed and wounded, while the right lost 3,000 killed and wounded and 1,000 prisoners.  Battle of Coruña 16 January 1809  After a desperate retreat across the mountains of north western Spain, the British army had reached the coast at Betanzos by the morning of 10 January 1809.  On 12 January the first French infantry column arrived, and a day of skirmishing followed. On 13 January the French cavalry under Franceschi found a way across the river at Celas, seven miles inland. At this point Moore ordered Paget to retreat back to the heights around Coruña. Meanwhile the French crossed the river, and then concentrated on repairing the bridge at El Burgo.  On 14 January the French artillery was able to cross the bridge, but Soult did not rush towards Coruña. His Corps was still badly stretched out. In the afternoon the British transport fleet reached Coruña. By the time the fighting began on 16 January the British had embarked their sick and wounded, most of the cavalry, and all but nine of their sixty guns.  That still left 15,000 men in Moore’s army. Many units that had virtually disintegrated during the retreat recovered, especially when it was realized that a battle was coming. Moore decided to defend Monte Mero, a ridge south of Coruña. This was a reasonably strong position, protected on its left by the rÃa del Burgo, but the right end of the ridge was within artillery range of the next line of ridges, the altos de Peñasquedo, the main French position. To protect his open right flank Moore posted one third of his army as a refused flank guard, with Fraser’s division on the Altos de San Margarita, on the far side of the valley (the division was based in Coruña with orders to move out the moment the fighting began), and Paget’s division at Oza, in the valley itself.  The French force was far superior. Soult had 4,500 horsemen and about 40 guns, with just over 27,000 infantry. If the French had lost one third of their army during the pursuit, this would still have left them with 20,000 infantry. Some French accounts gave Soult only 13,000 infantry, which would suggest that the French had lost (or detached) up to half of their strength without fighting a single battle!  Delaborde’s division was on the French right, Merle in the centre and Mermet on the left, with Lahoussaye and Franceschi to Mermet’s left. Soult noted the weakness in the British position, and decided to attack their right flank. A strong artillery battery was placed on the hills opposite Baird’s division. Delaborde and Merle were to attack the British left and centre, to prevent them from moving reinforcements to the right. Mermet’s division was to attack Bentinck’s brigade, and attempt to work their way around his right flank. Lahoussaye’s cavalry was to advance down the valley towards the coast, while Franceshi went straight for Coruña.  Soult’s starting position was on the heights of Palavea and of Penasquedo. This was rugged ground, with no roads along the ridges, and took the French until noon on 16 January to get into position. Moore was becoming convinced that the French would not attack that day, and he ordered Paget’s division to return to Coruña to embark onto the transports; between 1.30 and 2 PM the French attack began.  On the British left, near the river, Delaborde’s orders were to pin the British in place, but his attack was at best half-hearted. Some fighting took place in the village of Piedralonga, in the valley below the British lines, but never developed into a serious clash.  The main French attack was on the British right. Here the eight cavalry regiments under Lahoussaye and Franceschi began to move around the British right, eight battalions of infantry (two brigades) from Mermet’s division advanced down the heights of Penasquedo and up the slope towards the British position, Mermet’s third brigade began to advance around the British right flank, and the French artillery bombarded the British lines. Very early in the battle General Baird, the commander on this flank, was seriously wounded when a cannon ball hit his arm, forcing Moore to take personal command. He recalled Paget from Coruña and ordered Fraser to take up his watching position to guard against the French cavalry.  The 4th regiment, at the extreme right of the line, was ordered to throw back its right wing to guard against the flanking move, while the 42nd and 50th regiments advanced into a position where they could fire volleys into the French columns. After the Guards were called in from the reserve the French were forced to retreat, and the victorious British were able to embark.
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Vimeiro, Espinosa de los Montaños, Tudela, La Coruña    November 1808 — January 1809.  A series of defeats provoked Napoleon to lead 200,000 men into the Peninsula. The British attacked near Burgos but were soon forced into a long retreat punctuated by the battles of Sahagún, Benavente and Cacabelos, ending in an evacuation from Coruña in January, 1809. Moore was mortally wounded while directing the defence of the town in the Battle of Coruña. After only two months in Spain, Napoleon handed command over to Marshal Soult and returned to France, to prepare for renewed hostilities against Austria..  Espinosa de los Monteros  A Spanish army under General Joaquin Blake advanced, hoping to cut the French lines of communication back to Bayonne, but instead was defeated by a French army under Marshal Lefebvre at Zornoza on 31 October, and retreated back to Bilbao. Blake then turned at bay to rescue one of his divisions trapped in the mountains (5 November), before resuming his retreat.  By 10 November three French Corps were threatening Blake’s retreat. In direct pursuit through the mountains came Marshal Victor’s I Corps. Lefebvre’s V Corps was on a flank march toward Reinosa, well to the southwest of the Blake. Marshal Soult’s II Corps routed a Spanish army at Gamonal and captured Burgos.  After a skirmish at Valmaceda on 8 November, Blake reached Espinosa de los Monteros with 22,000 men. Blake was informed that he was in danger of being cut off. He took advantage of a ridge line at Espinosa to make a stand north of the Trueba River. On his right he placed his rearguard of 5,000 experienced soldiers under San Román, on a hill close to the river. In the center the ridgeline descended into gap held by the Vanguard Brigade and the 3rd Division. On the left, the Asturian division held Las Peñucas ridge. Two Divisions and a brigade were in reserve.  Victor had around 21,000 infantry in three divisions. They would have to attack from the Campo de Pedralva, a small plain to the. The battle began early in the afternoon of 10 November when General Villatte’s division arrived well ahead of the rest of the French army. Instead of waiting for Victor, he launched an attack against the Spanish right, masking that attack with six battalions to guard against a counterattack.  After two hours, the Spanish position was holding well. At around 3 PM Victor arrived along with his remaining two divisions. These fresh troops attacked the same part of the Spanish right with nine battalions while leaving the rest of the Spanish line untouched. This allowed Blake to move his 2nd and 3rd Divisions to the right to support San Román. Once again the French attack was repulsed.  Although the battle continued the next day, most of the casualties were suffered on the first day. Both sides lost about 1,000 men killed and wounded.   Battle of Tudela  On 21 November Castaños was between Logroño and Tudela. The French III Corps had crossed the Ebro at Logroño, heading east towards Calahorra, while Marshal Ney’s column had reached the upper Douro valley and was headed in the direction of Tudela. This left Castaños’s army in serious danger of being trapped between two French corps.  Castaños escaped by pulling back to Tudela. There he decided to defend a ten mile long front, stretching west from Tudela on the banks of the Ebro, along the line of a small river to Cascante and then to Tarazona, at the foot of the Sierra de Moncayo. Castaños was well aware that he did not have enough men to defend this line, and so he called for help from General O’Neille’s two divisions at Caparrosa on the east bank of the Ebro. O’Neille was under the command of Palafox, and refused to move without permission from his commander. This was not given until noon on 22 November. O’Neille reached the east bank of the Ebro opposite Tudela late on the same day, but then decided to postpone his crossing until the 23rd.  At nightfall on 22 November Castaños’s army was very badly stretched. Close to 45,000 Spanish troops were in the vicinity of Tudela, very few of them in the front line. Castaños placed two divisions of his own army at Cascante and Tarazona. His third division was on the east bank of the Ebro, as were the two divisions from the Army of Aragón (O’Neille and Saint March). During the battle of 23 November most of the fighting would involve these last three divisions, a force of around 23,000 infantry. Castaños also had a large number of horsemen – 3,600 in total – but failed to employ them, and would be caught completely by surprise.  On the morning of 23 November Lannes split his corps into two columns. The smaller column, containing Lagrange’s infantry division and two cavalry brigades, was sent towards Cascante, while the larger column, containing Moncey’s III Corps, was sent along the Ebro towards Tudela. Lagrange would not be involved in the fighting at Tudela. Marshal Lannes force was just under 34,000 strong, including the four infantry divisions and three cavalry regiments of Moncey’s Corps as well as Lagrange’s infantry division and Colbert’s cavalry from Ney’s corps. On the night before the battle Lannes’s force had camped at Alfaro, ten miles up the Ebro from Tudela.  While the French were advancing, Castaños was attempting to get O’Neille’s three divisions across the Ebro. General Roca was across first, and had just reached his place at the right of the Spanish line when the French made their first attack. Saint March’s division was second to cross, and was also able to take its allotted place in the line before the French attacked, but O’Neille’s division had to fight off a force of French skirmishers who had reached the top of the Cabezo Malla ridge ahead of them.  This first French attack was carried out by Lannes’s vanguard. As he arrived in front of Tudela, the Marshal had realised that the Spanish were not yet in place, and had decided to risk launching an improvised attack with his leading brigades. This attack was repulsed, but it did reveal just how weak the Spanish position was. Even after the three divisions at Tudela were in place, there was still a three mile gap to La Peña’s force at Cascante.  The result of the battle would be decided by the behaviour of La Peña and Grimarest. By noon both men had received orders to move – La Peña to close the gap with the troops at Tudela, and Grimarest to Cascante. Neither man responded. La Peña moved two brigades slightly to the east, but made no other move, allowing his division to be pinned in place by two French cavalry brigades. At noon Castaños himself attempted to reach La Peña to order him to move in person, but his movement was detected by some French cavalrymen, and he only escaped after a long chase.  Marshal Lannes’s second attack was carried out in much greater strength. On the French left Morlot’s division attacked Roca’s division on the heights above Tudela. To the right Mathieu’s division made a frontal assault on O’Neille, while attempting to outflank him. Both attacks succeeded. Roca’s division broke when French troops began to reach the top of the ridge, while O’Neille’s was pushed off the ridge and outflanked. Finally the French cavalry under Lefebvre-Desnouettes charged at the gap between Roca and Saint March, and the entire Spanish right collapsed.  Meanwhile on the left La Peña and Grimarest had finally united at Cascante, giving them a total of around 18,000 infantry and 3,000 foot. They were opposed by Legrange’s division, 6,000 strong, and a small number of dragoons. After watching the defeat of the rest of the Spanish army, they withdrew under cover of darkness. The Spanish left suffered only 200 killed and wounded, while the right lost 3,000 killed and wounded and 1,000 prisoners.  Battle of Coruña 16 January 1809  After a desperate retreat across the mountains of north western Spain, the British army had reached the coast at Betanzos by the morning of 10 January 1809.  On 12 January the first French infantry column arrived, and a day of skirmishing followed. On 13 January the French cavalry under Franceschi found a way across the river at Celas, seven miles inland. At this point Moore ordered Paget to retreat back to the heights around Coruña. Meanwhile the French crossed the river, and then concentrated on repairing the bridge at El Burgo.  On 14 January the French artillery was able to cross the bridge, but Soult did not rush towards Coruña. His Corps was still badly stretched out. In the afternoon the British transport fleet reached Coruña. By the time the fighting began on 16 January the British had embarked their sick and wounded, most of the cavalry, and all but nine of their sixty guns.  That still left 15,000 men in Moore’s army. Many units that had virtually disintegrated during the retreat recovered, especially when it was realized that a battle was coming. Moore decided to defend Monte Mero, a ridge south of Coruña. This was a reasonably strong position, protected on its left by the rÃa del Burgo, but the right end of the ridge was within artillery range of the next line of ridges, the altos de Peñasquedo, the main French position. To protect his open right flank Moore posted one third of his army as a refused flank guard, with Fraser’s division on the Altos de San Margarita, on the far side of the valley (the division was based in Coruña with orders to move out the moment the fighting began), and Paget’s division at Oza, in the valley itself.  The French force was far superior. Soult had 4,500 horsemen and about 40 guns, with just over 27,000 infantry. If the French had lost one third of their army during the pursuit, this would still have left them with 20,000 infantry. Some French accounts gave Soult only 13,000 infantry, which would suggest that the French had lost (or detached) up to half of their strength without fighting a single battle!  Delaborde’s division was on the French right, Merle in the centre and Mermet on the left, with Lahoussaye and Franceschi to Mermet’s left. Soult noted the weakness in the British position, and decided to attack their right flank. A strong artillery battery was placed on the hills opposite Baird’s division. Delaborde and Merle were to attack the British left and centre, to prevent them from moving reinforcements to the right. Mermet’s division was to attack Bentinck’s brigade, and attempt to work their way around his right flank. Lahoussaye’s cavalry was to advance down the valley towards the coast, while Franceshi went straight for Coruña.  Soult’s starting position was on the heights of Palavea and of Penasquedo. This was rugged ground, with no roads along the ridges, and took the French until noon on 16 January to get into position. Moore was becoming convinced that the French would not attack that day, and he ordered Paget’s division to return to Coruña to embark onto the transports; between 1.30 and 2 PM the French attack began.  On the British left, near the river, Delaborde’s orders were to pin the British in place, but his attack was at best half-hearted. Some fighting took place in the village of Piedralonga, in the valley below the British lines, but never developed into a serious clash.  The main French attack was on the British right. Here the eight cavalry regiments under Lahoussaye and Franceschi began to move around the British right, eight battalions of infantry (two brigades) from Mermet’s division advanced down the heights of Penasquedo and up the slope towards the British position, Mermet’s third brigade began to advance around the British right flank, and the French artillery bombarded the British lines. Very early in the battle General Baird, the commander on this flank, was seriously wounded when a cannon ball hit his arm, forcing Moore to take personal command. He recalled Paget from Coruña and ordered Fraser to take up his watching position to guard against the French cavalry.  The 4th regiment, at the extreme right of the line, was ordered to throw back its right wing to guard against the flanking move, while the 42nd and 50th regiments advanced into a position where they could fire volleys into the French columns. After the Guards were called in from the reserve the French were forced to retreat, and the victorious British were able to embark.
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